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The issue of how to meet basic needs has become
a central concern in view of the frequent failure
of economic growth to do this. This paper
proposes to consider the mechanisms through
which the competitive economy generates prob-
lems with respect to basic needs and to show
that under conditions of excess labour supply it
will tend to create such difficulties in the course
of its 'normal' operation. The paper will hence
suggest that there is a need to examine critically
the now common propositions: that a primary
concern with basic needs represents misplaced
welfarism; that the problem of basic needs afflicts
only those not yet fortunate enough to be in-
corporated in the 'modern' economy; and that
wage reductions and the abolition of minimum
wages are paradoxically an important means of
solving the problem of basic needs.
Before proceeding to these issues two points
should be made. First, the problems identified
in this paper do not in themselves establish non-
market economies as preferable alternatives.
Although there is evidence to suggest that socialist
economies meet basic needs more effectively at
given levels of productivity, no conclusions can he
re.ached until one has considered fully the nature
of this 'alternative' as it appears in practice in a
developing economy. Second, the approach of
this paper eschews the debate in terms of static
'definitions' of basic needs- --i.e. do people iieed
2,300 calories, or can they make do with 2,200---
as essentially a futile exercise. The present concern
is with the process of growth and change, and it
accepts the historical arid cultural relativity of
any possible set of static limits.
As for the legitimacy of the concern about basic
needs, this concern is without doubt the most
readily defensible reason for any concern with
development and change. lt is also a 'democratic'
concern in that it would, almost by definition,
be legitimised by popular choice. In other words
the concern itself is not under discussion. What is
at issue, is the way in which the basic needs of
the population in general, can best he met. Some
of the problems pertaining to that debate will be
raised in this note.
In essence this paper seeks to draw attention to
two features of the market economy: the poten-
tial divorce between the price paid for labour and
its productivity, whenever labour power must be
sold in a labour market; and the critical
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importance of full employment in such a system.
Thus. under conditions of excess labour supply,
there is a powerful tendency to depress the level
of wages, and this pressure acknowledges no lower
limits hearing any relation to basic needs. Further-
more it asserts that the effects of this pressure are
also conveyed to other incomes which can be
earned by labour through petty production or
peasant activities, as well as to the scope for
raising the social wage in any particular economy.
The necessary empirical basis for this discussion is
the massive, and mounting, problem of global
unemployment. While this has always been
recognised as an endemic problem for the
developing countries, the past decade has seen it
re-emerge in the industrialised economies on a
large scale and in a relatively intractable form.
As a result, large-scale global unemployment j
treated as a fact for the foreseeable future.
The theoretical bases of the views expressed here,
are the formulations of the classical economists
because they were concerned explicity with the
consequences of an excess labour supply. Their
consideration of these issues suggested that the
downward pressures on labour's wages was
essentially without limit, apart from the
Maithusian limits imposed by increased mortality
and lowered fertility. Although it is true that
Marx appeared to provide a limit in the form of
"the cost of reproduction of labour", this turns
out to be merely a definition of what the long-
run limit must he, and leaves open the possibility
that actual levels may fall well below this while
an excess supply of labour persists.
More recently, Arthur Lewis seemed to have
provided a lower limit to this downward pressure
on wages, in the form of the subsistence income
obtainable from peasant production, although
such a limit may, of course, still raise problems of
basic needs. Its existeiice is, in any event, due
to the fact that it is a special case dependent on
the existence of free and continuing access to the
means of production in the traditional sector of
the economy. While this possibility will be briefly
considered below, at this stage the Lewis argument
niay be taken to confirm the point that without
such an alternative an endogenous limit to the
wage does not exist.
At this point the reader may well feel that the
argument has proven too much. If global unem-
ployment is massive, and if under conditions of
excess labour supply the downward pressure on
wages is fierce and without limit, then one may
have explained the persistence of basic needs
difficulties, but one must now account for the
fact that a very substantial proportion of all wage
earners have met considerably more than their
basic needs.
Broadly speaking there are three factors involved
in such 'aberrations': an endogenous lower limit
to wages which one might term the efficiency
wage; a disappearance of the over-supply of
labour in particular labour markets; or the
application of social or political power to raise
wage levels, or at least to establish lower limits
to their reduction.
The notion of the efficiency wage arises the
moment labour is no longer treated as being
perfectly hornogenous and hence infinitely replace-
able (as in some migrant labour based 'ticket'
systems). Once labourers are employed perma-
nently then their energy and strength is ultimately
related to their wage, so that a limit will be
reached below which productivity losses offset
the gains to capital from the low wage. In some
technologically advanced industries, where the
reliability of labour becomes relatively important,
this efficiency wage may rise considerably. The
theoretical importance of this possibility stems
from the fact that where this is the mechanism
determining the wage, further reductions of wages
do not contribute to increased surplus, growth
or employment.
Apart from the efficiency wage, the other cases
of wages exempt from the general downwaçd
pressure all relate to an objective or artificial
segmentation of the labour market. This may be
based on existing (skill or other) differentials(objective), or on the pure political power to
restrict entry to a trade (artificial), although in
general the two go very much together in that
artíflcial' restrictions are generally based on
'objective' differences, at least in the first instance.
In considering the favourable positions thus
gained by sections of labour, it is impossible to
avoid the conclusion that all such gains are sub-
ject to erosion over time. Hence positions based
on skill dilierentials for example are eroded on
one hand through dcvelopnients in education and
training, and on the other hand, through technical
change, while analogous mechanisms operate in
other instances.
A special mention is due here to the segmentation
of the global labour market which is based on
national distinctions. The major divide in this
respect is, of course, between those countries
identified within GATT as the Group I countries-
colloquially known as 'the high wage countries"
and the rest. It is clear that labour in the Group
I countries has been able to use a degree of poli-
tical power, albeit in a favourable economic
cliniate, in order to obtain rising real wages and
to widen the gulf between itself and labour
elsewhere. This has also involved the provision of
substantial social wages in the form of public
facilities, and social security benefits. In part this
has been due to objective differentials in skill,
education or productivity, in part it has been
due to their ability to use trade restrictions
selectively in their favour.
There are indications that the foundations of the
positioll of the workers in the central economies
may be being undermined, in accordance with
the proposition that in the global context of
this discussion, all such sectional gains are
subject to erosion. This is especially true if the
compass of the competitive market extends
beyond the limits of the political entity on the
basis of which the existing conditions had been
won. Hence just as the restrictions of local unions
were destroyed by national markets, so inter-
national markets will tend to undermine the gains
of national unions, or indeed of governments.
Hence when minimum wage legislation is swept
away by the pressures of international competi-
tion, one is merely witnessing one facet of a very
general process. One must add, however, that
although this process has become more active in
the last decade, the emergence of protectionist
sentiments indicate that opposition will clearly
continue to he mounted against such develop-
ments. At this stage the outcome is by no means
clear.
In short the downward pressures on wages which
one would anticipate in the context of an excess
supply of labour appear to be real enough on a
global scale. They are tending to undermine the
positions of those sections of the labour force
which have to date secured more favourable
conditions. The fact that this is a very slow
process, and that at any time many sections of
labour will be differentiated from the great pooi
of labour which is in excess supply, merely
indicates why the system can at one and the same
time sustain substantial sections of the labour
force at wages well above a level necessary to
satisfy basic needs, while still tending constantly
to reproduce problems with regards to the meeting
of basic needs for the rest.
Thus far, the option of reducing wages to solve
the problem of basic needs has been excluded by
the assumption of persistent large-scale unemploy-
ment for the foreseeable future. Essentially the
wage reduction argument depends on the proposi-
tion that stich (potentially iinliniited) reductions
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will eventually lead lo full employment which will
then begin to push wages up. As a general,
unqualified proposition this has little plausïbility
in the current international context, and in the
absence of a prospect of full employment, amounts
essentially to proposing the cutting of wages,
ultimately to starvation levels------so that others
may get work at these same starvation rates.
Yet, in a qualified form, such proposals may have
some validity so long as one is not dealing with
efficiency wages. Hence it is conceivable that some
reductions in the highest wages and salaries might
be legitimately proposed so long as this argument
did not deny the need to establish a lower limit
to this process. In any case, such proposals would
need to ensure that: the differential is not a
scarcity rent for an objectively defined skill, and
that factor substitutability is significant and the
wage cost effect substantial enough to induce
factor substitution. Otherwise a wage reduction
would not, in fact, benefit other workers.
Equally, the crude and simple argument that lower
wages, mean lower consumption, mean more
investment and hence more growth must be
qualified in relation to the nature of the invest-
ment function. In short, if there is a continuing
inducement and opportunity to invest, such an
argument may be true, If those conditions are
not met it becomes perverse. Furthermore, even
if it is true, it may not lead to full employment
for a very long time, in which case the validity
of the argument for labour in general is still most
dubious.
The final point to consider in this general context
concertis the question of non-wage income
alternatives. hascd on some limited access to pro-
ductive resources. Without going into the detailed
possibilities, it is possible to identify two cases for
the purposes of this discussion. One case where
such income opportunities conflict with wage
levels, and another, in which they do not conflict.
The former case is one in which such jncomo
opportunities are plentiful and remunerative. They
would hence tend to establish a floor to wages
in the ArthUr Lewis sense. However, the main-
tenance of such a floor would depend on the
absence of competitive pressures to break through
such limits. If there were such competitive pres-
sures, for example through the pursuit of a manu-
factured export promotion strategy, curbs would
have to he put on these domestic activities either
through devaluation, or through more direct
restrictive policies under the general heading of
the deflation of the domestic economy.
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1f there is no conflict, in that the non-wage
incomes are restricted in scope and below the level
even of low wages, then the two may co-exist quite
happily. In both cases the non-wage income may
of course provide a secondary source of family
income, and may thus play some role in allowing
wages to be depressed even further by reducing
labour's resistance to such reductions.
In conclusion one may note that efforts to solve
the problem of basic needs must take account of
the processes within which ut us generated. In the
context of a more competitive international econ-
oniy it becomes increasingly difficult to envisage
the possibility of damping the pressures of compe-
tition either through attempting to fix minimum
wage levels, or through seeking to provide social
benefits. In such a context it is also of doubtful
validity to begin talking of massive international
transfers of funds to bring basic needs up to some
arbitrary standard everywhere. The inevitable
failure of such highly hyp6thetical and unlikely
resources to arrive at their proposed destinations,
will not in the event be properly understood by
reference to the usual scapegoats of corruption or
inefficiency (though these would undoubtedly
play their part). Rather such failure must be seen
in terms of the sheer economic necessity of main-
taining a competitive position and ensurin.g a
labour supply at the wage rates dictated by that
struggle. In other words hypothetical transfers of
this kind must be assessed in relation to the
processes discussed here. They cannot be con-
sidered as if they were transfers to some unfortu-
nates excluded from, and unrelated to, these
processes. When transfer payments of this kind
exceed the income levels required for 'successful'
production their consequences for that production
process become paramount.
In the final analysis the competitive economy
can solve this problem in general, only when it
reaches full employment. In the meantime we will
have to endure the spectacle of comfortable
experts who advocate the removal of all lower
limits to wages on the grounds that this may
contribute to the generation of full employment
some time in the future. The suffering thus
countenanced is unfortunately real and certain,
whie the supposed benefits for the mass of the
population are distant and highly uncertain. The
fact thai many are nonetheless advocating this
policy is partly due to the fact that the benefits to
capital (and capitalism) tend also to he more
immediate and certain. In any case it seenis that
those who advocate the policy rarely do the
suffering. while those who do the suffering rarely
espoiise the policy.
